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BOOK REVIEWS
ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA. By Robert Nozick. 1 New York, New
York: Basic Books, Inc. 1974. Pp. xvi, 367. $12.95.
Reviewed by Alan R. Mabe2
A few years ago there was speculation that political philosophy
was dying if not already dead. Recent publications such as John
Rawls' A Theory of Justice and Robert Nozick's Anarchy, State, and
Utopia show that such speculation was mistaken. There is a renewed
vigor in contemporary political philosophy. Nozick's view, which
challenges both Rawls' theory and the Marxian position, will likely
generate a vigorous and high-level debate among proponents of al-
ternative positions in political philosophy.
It is necessary to locate Nozick's discussion in the context of con-
tinuing debates in moral and political philosophy. Utilitarianism
has been widely accepted in moral and political philosophy, but in
recent years it has been attacked on the ground that some of the
actions sanctioned by the utility principle do not coincide with some
of our deeply held moral beliefs. Critics claim, for example, that punish-
ment of an innocent person can be justified by the principle of utility
if certain conditions hold. Rawls' theory of justice is an alternative
to the utilitarian account of justice. In Rawls' view utilitarianism can-
not account for basic rights people have. In fact, Rawls suggests that
under certain conditions utilitarian moral theory could be used to
justify slavery. That is because in utilitarianism what is right or just
is understood in terms of maximizing good, however identified. Hence,
if the total value of a society with slavery exceeds that of any alterna-
tive society, the former would be the moral alternative. Rawls be-
lieves that a person's rights cannot be exchanged for an increase in
another's happiness. According to Rawls' theory, rights are independent
of the maximization of any identifiable good, e.g., pleasure or happi-
ness. But Rawls allows economic redistribution under a "difference
principle" that justifies inequalities (primarily economic) when they
provide advantages to the least advantaged. The rights Rawls de-
fends so vigorously correspond to that range of rights we designate
as civil liberties.
Nozick accepts many of Rawls' criticisms of utilitarianism, and
like Rawls makes rights fundamental in his position. But he differs
1. Professor of Philosophy, Harvard University.
2. Assistant Professor of Philosophy, Florida State University; Chairman, Editorial
Committee, SOCIAL THEORY & PRACTIC.L
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from Rawls by including traditional property rights in his list of
basic or fundamental rights; hence, he is opposed to forced transfers
in the economic domain. Nozick raises the perennial question of what
things a government can justifiably force a citizen to do. He argues
that considerably less coercion of citizens can be justified than Rawls,
socialists, or people generally believe. Nozick is not an anarchist; he
argues that some coercion by government can be justified, but there
is a limit, and our current political practices (I presume) far exceed
that limit.
Let me complete the background for Nozick's discussion with
some remarks about political theory. Central to anarchist theory is
the view that coercion by government of a citizen conceived to be
an autonomous moral agent can never be morally justified. Liberal
democratic theorists have taken this position seriously and have tried
to refute the anarchist by developing a theory of justification for
governmental coercion. One seemingly attractive answer to the an-
archist is social contract theory. (Utilitarianism offers another
answer.) If a citizen's voluntary act (an explicit act, tacit acquiescence,
or even a hypothetical act) has created a moral obligation to obey
political authority, a government that coerces him when he fails to
meet his obligation is, in effect, forcing him to do the moral thing.
Hence governmental coercion is morally justifiable. (This is a brief
statement of the argument, which needs a number of restrictions at-
tached to make it plausible; it will, however, do for our purposes.)
Assuming some type of unanimous consent, government forces citizens
to do merely what they have voluntarily agreed to do. Herein, con-
tract theorists thought, was the answer to the anarchists. But contract
theory offers no obvious limits to what people might or should agree
to. Thus one could possibly extend the contract argument to justify
a wide range of governmental activity, especially if only some form
of hypothetical agreement were involved (e.g., whatever a rational
moral agent would agree to under conditions C). Rawls uses a suitably
revised and extended social contract approach in constructing and
defending his theory of justice, which in turn is used in justifying
governmental coercion of citizens where, for example, economic re-
distribution is involved.
Nozick believes that the state can operate legitimately over a cer-
tain domain, but he wants to limit severely the role of the state. Tra-
ditional social contract theory is not attractive to Nozick partly be-
cause it has been extended to justify types of governmental activities
that he thinks illegitimate, and partly because of inherent difficulties
in the contract theorist's reply to the anarchist. He needs an argument
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that will refute the anarchist, but one which cannot be extended to
justify more than a minimal state.
Nozick attempts to justify a minimal state without recourse to the
device of unanimous contract. In the first part of the book the argu-
ment for the minimal state is developed; in the second part, argu-
ments for more than a minimal state are examined and rejected; in
the third part, Nozick relates his conception of the state to utopian
speculation. I will discuss each of these parts in turn.
The starting point for Nozick's argument is a state of nature in
which individuals have rights: "Individuals have rights, and there
are things no person or group may do to them (without violating
their rights). So strong and far-reaching are these rights that they
raise the question of what, if anything, the state and its officials may
do" (p. ix). Nozick wants to show how a state could come into existence
without violating anyone's rights. He uses a Weberian definition of
the state: an entity that has a monopoly on the use of force in a given
geographical territory. His account of the state must meet these
conditions if he is to succeed.
. Nozick accepts Locke's account of rights in the state of nature. In
Locke's view, "everyone has a right to punish the transgressors of
that law [of nature] to such a degree as may hinder its violation." 3
One has a right to punish others when one is harmed by others. Due
to the inconvenience and perhaps ineffectiveness of doing this for
oneself, one may voluntarily contract with another to punish those
who harm oneself. In fact, many people may do this, and a number of
"protective associations" might be formed. Nozick suggests that pro-
tective associations may arrange to adjust conflict among themselves.
According to Nozick, there eventually would be a single Dominant
Protective Association (DPA) that would prevent harm to its clients
and punish those who succeed in violating its clients' rights. The
DPA would violate no one's rights-it would prevent one person from
interfering with another's rights and, failing to prevent that, would
punish the aggressor. Since the DPA's right to do these things is based
solely on the transfer of rights from individuals in the state of nature,
and since exercise of those rights in the state of nature violates no one
else's rights, their exercise by the DPA violates no one's rights. Suppose,
however, there are those in the territory who do not want to join the
DPA. They would continue to protect themselves and punish violators
of their rights. Further, suppose an independent (a non-member of a
DPA) attempts to punish a client of a DPA. There must be some pro-
3. J. LocKE, The Second Treatise of Civil Government ch. II, § 7, in Two TRAnsEs
OF GOVERNMENT 124 (T. Cook ed. 1947).
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cedure to determine guilt, or punishment would not differ from simple
aggression. In the state of nature, one has a right to prevent unfair
procedures for determining guilt from being applied to oneself. If
this right were transferred, the DPA would have a right to prevent an
independent from imposing an unfair or risky procedure on a client.
Thus the independent would find himself at a disadvantage if a DPA
grew up around him.
Nozick introduces the principle of compensation at this point in
his argument. For our purposes the following formulation will suffice:
If in the course of the exercise of one's rights one disadvantages another
person, one may be required to compensate him for those disadvantages.
The specific form for the argument would require "those imposing a
prohibition on risky activities [e.g., DPA clients prohibiting independ-
ents from applying their own guilt determination procedures] to com-
pensate those disadvantaged through having these risky activities pro-
hibited to them" (p. 87). The compensation to independents would
take the form of protection provided them by the Dominant Pro-
tective Association and paid for by the voluntary clients of that agency.
DPA clients, however, would be required to pay compensation only
if the independent were in fact disadvantaged.
Nozick believes that at this stage the Dominant Protective Associa-
tion would resemble a state, albeit a minimal one. There would be a
de facto monopoly on the use of force (simply because the DPA would
be much more powerful than independents), and all in the territory
would receive protection from the DPA. Yet the DPA would not be
formed by a unanimous social contract. According to Nozick, the
DPA would develop to this point without violating anyone's rights
(the independent has no right to impose risky procedures to deter-
mine another's guilt); thus the anarchist has no ground on which to
oppose the minimal state.
But an economic redistribution appears to occur in this minimal
state-clients pay for the protection of disadvantaged independents.
Hence, this form of redistribution might provide the pattern for other
and more extensive redistributions in a more-than-minimal state.
Nozick argues, however, that a shift of funds is redistributive only
when done for redistributive reasons. The economic shift in Nozick's
minimal state would occur to protect client's rights and avoid violation
of the principle of compensation; the shift would not occur for the
sake of redistribution. There is, therefore, no redistribution as such
in the minimal state.
Having offered a model of a minimal state premised on strong
individual rights, Nozick proceeds to argue: "The minimal state is
[Vol. 3
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the most extensive state that can be justified. Any state more extensive
violates people's rights" (p. 149). In this part of the book he examines
the view "that a more extensive state is justified, because necessary (or
the best instrument) to achieve distributive justice" (p. 149). He de-
votes most of his attention to a critical examination (and finally a re-
jection) of Rawls' argument for his two principles of justice. Nozick
distinguishes end-state principles of justice from historical principles
of justice. End-state principles redistribute according to a criterion that
ignores how we arrived at our existing distribution. Historical
principles "hold that past circumstances or actions of people can
create differential entitlements or differential deserts to things" (p.
155). Nozick labels his own theory, which is based on historical rather
than end-state principles, the entitlement theory of justice in holdings.
That theory has three basic principles: the principles of acquisition
and transfer, and the principle of rectification, which is applicable
only if one or both of the other two principles is violated. He
argues that the entitlement theory of justice is not a patterned theory
of distribution, as apparently Rawls' is. Patterned theories distribute
according to some criterion that ignores rights in existing holdings.
For example, the formula for a patterned distribution is "to each ac-
cording to his --" (need, merit, I.Q., etc.).
Nozick suggests that most discussions of distributive justice general-
ly presuppose that the solution will be a patterned distribution. The
entitlement theory is offered by Nozick as an alternative to the whole
range of patterned and end-state schemes of distribution. Nozick
argues that difficulties involved in maintaining a given pattern will
generate further regulations concerning how resources received can
be used. He offers the example of a society that distributes assets in
equal shares. Are there limits on how individuals can dispose of their
shares? Imagine a voluntary scheme in this society in which Wilt
Chamberlain agrees to play basketball for the season only if each fan
is willing to pay twenty-five cents in addition to the regular admission
price. Attendance for the season of 1,000,000 fans results in $250,000
for Chamberlain. Is he entitled to it? Are the fans entitled to spend
their shares that way? Nozick argues that patterned distributions will
either be very unstable or the amount of interference necessary to
maintain them will become intolerable (e.g., the fans will not be able
to see Chamberlain play basketball).
Nozick apparently means for this criticism to apply to Rawls'
theory of justice, but it is unclear whether Rawls' difference prin-
ciple (inequalities are justified only if they provide advantages to the
least advantaged), which exhibits a tendency toward equality, has the
1975]
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defects Nozick alleges. An assessment of Nozick's account of Rawls
would require the independent development of some of the themes
in Rawls' work. This is not possible here; one theme, however, can
be considered briefly.
Rawls wants to discount natural abilities and developed talents
(among other things) as a basis for distributing income, since these
things are arbitrary from a moral point of view (or so Rawls claims).
Talents and developed capacities, though possessed by individuals, are
viewed by Rawls as collective assets. Talents and capacities are not
to be rewarded for their own sake but only when they are put to
work for society's benefit. The size of the share given talented persons
is based neither on degrees of talent or capacity nor solely on the
value of social contribution. It is based on whether inequalities (larger
shares) are necessary to assure that talents will be exercised for society's
benefit. If enough people would exercise particular talents without
the inducement of larger shares, then larger shares would not be
justified.
If people could base their claims to distributive shares on natural
assets or developed capacities, Rawls' difference principle would be
severely restricted in its operation. Nozick argues that Rawls fails to
make the case for discounting natural abilities and developed capacities
as a basis for receiving shares. "We have found no cogent argument
to (help) establish that differences in holding arising from differences
in natural assets should be eliminated or minimized" (p. 226). In
Nozick's view, if Rawls cannot make this case, his theory of justice
(which includes the difference principle as one of two basic principles
defining just institutions) is seriously weakened. Thus it becomes an
unattractive basis for justifying more than a minimal state.
Nozick briefly explores some Marxian themes, particularly envy,
worker control, and exploitation. The discussion of envy is very in-
teresting. Rawls argues that envy could be reduced and self-esteem
increased if wide inequalities were eliminated. Nozick argues that
envy cannot be eliminated; self-esteem is based on differentiating
ourselves from others-if one mode of comparison is eliminated atten-
tion will shift to another mode. We envy those who come out higher
on some scale than we do. With many scales we can find some scale
on which we rate highly. But Nozick thinks that an egalitarian society
would eliminate many scales. Hence there would be fewer bases for
self-esteem and, contrary to Rawls' view, self-esteem would fall and
envy grow.
Regarding worker control, Nozick suggests that unions are now
rich enough to experiment with entirely worker-owned and worker-
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controlled factories. A more than minimal state is not needed to pro-
vide worker control since workers who want worker control can
have it under voluntary arrangements. His discussion of exploitation
is rather brief and generally unsatisfactory. There is a brief discussion
of the labor theory of value. He classifies it as a species of the "produc-
tive resources theory of value" and rejects it on the following grounds:
"Thus Marx holds that this labor isn't all socially necessary. What
is socially necessary, and how much of it is, will be determined by
what happens on the market!! There is no longer any labor theory
of value; the central notion of socially necessary labor time is itself
defined in terms of the processes and exchange ratios of a competitive
market!" (p. 260). The argument relevant to the main theme may
be extracted as follows: Marx was so muddled about economic matters
that one can hardly use his reflections as a basis for justifying more
than the minimal state. Nozick does not make that argument explicitly,
but the discussion suggests something of that thrust.
The third part of Nozick's book is devoted to a discussion of utopia.
That discussion is interesting but not particularly original. The key
idea is that what is needed is a framework for utopia and not specific,
detailed blueprints for creating communities or states. The framework
should provide for the realization of many different types of utopian
experimental communities (many of which may become permanent):
"Utopia is a framework for utopias, a place where people are at liberty
to join together voluntarily to pursue and attempt to realize their own
vision of the good life in the ideal community but where no one can
impose his own utopian vision upon others" (p. 312). The concluding
discussion of utopia is supposed to result in our realization that the
minimal state is a noble idea, and hence is capable of inspiring us.
This sketch has located and developed some of the main themes of
Nozick's argument. The book is far richer than this sketch would
indicate; a number of other interesting but often tangential issues
are pursued. Nozick challenges many views which are widely accepted
by social and political philosophers and lawyers. Nozick is especially
good at locating the lack of argument for a position-for example, his
critical examination of Bernard Williams' argument for equality
(p. 233-35). Although the book is exceedingly provocative, it suffers
from some serious defects. 4 The distinction between entitlement
principles and patterned principles is an interesting one, but it is
not at all clear that particular theories fit entirely into one mold or
another. Rawls argues that people are entitled to certain basic rights
4. Nozick acknowledges (pp. xii-iv) that his argument is not well developed at all
points.
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e.g., B's right to personal private property). Rawls also notes that
his principles of justice are neutral between private and public owner-
ship arrangements; which arrangements are chosen depends on his-
torical conditions of a particular society. Apparently there would be
no need to change from one form of ownership to another if justice
could be achieved without such a change. As Nozick admits, there
may also be a large degree of patterned distribution under an entitle-
ment theory. For example, variations in distribution may vary with
natural capacity and circumstances of birth (blood lines) or combina-
tions of those factors. Nozick's conceptual framework here needs
further development to be fruitful.
Another troubling matter is Nozick's failure to indicate what
rights he considers basic. Obviously ownership of private property is
regarded as a basic right, but there is no clearly articulated list of
other fundamental rights to which individuals are entitled. If I am
correct in stating that entitlements operate in Rawls' theory, Nozick
and Rawls' difference may lie in their respective articulation of basic
rights, since both start from a "rights" prospective. Nozick discusses
Locke's account of rights and recognizes that the right to private
property is limited by the "proviso": "A process normally giving
rise to a permanent bequeathable property right in a previously un-
owned thing will not do so if the position of others no longer at
liberty to use the thing is thereby worsened" (p. 178). Nozick then
asserts: "I believe that the free operation of a market system will not
actually run afoul of the Lockean proviso" (p. 182). But there is
little argument for this belief and almost no consideration of non-
traditional private property arrangements. The content, range, and
strength of entitlements is at issue here. If inheritance disadvantages
some, why shouldn't they be compensated? Or consider an arrange-
ment of this sort: The right to hold and control private property is
absolute, except that it may not be transmitted to specific members
of the next generation. The result is an extremely strong private
property right5 of limited range-the property right would extend
one only over one's lifetime. 6 Nozick's entitlement theory suffers because
it does not include an explicit list of rights and arguments against
alternative lists. Further specificity is needed if we are to have a full
picture of Nozick's theory.
5. The right might be so strong as to preclude most forms of taxation; public
funds might come from the assets of the agency charged with redistributing wealth
after the death of its holder. Gifts would also have to be taxed if the scheme were
to be effective.
6. Cf. Van Doren, Redistributing Wealth by Curtailing Inheritance: The Community
Interest in the Rule Against Perpetuities and the Estate Tax, 3 FLA. ST. U.L. REv.
33 (1975).
[Vol. 3
BOOK REVIEWS
Consider a more radical alternative: Suppose the list of basic
economic rights included an individual right to the resources necessary
to satisfy basic human needs. Perhaps rights in holdings would be on
the list as well, but would be overriden when in conflict with the right
to essential resources. I recognize many difficulties in this suggestion,
but it does help make the point that the entitlement conception may be
compatable with a wide range of alternative formulations of basic
rights. Nozick admits that he has not provided the moral basis for
the theory of rights he articulates, and his theory suffers because of
this.
Within Nozick's formal principles of justice is the requirement for
rectification for injustices. Two sorts of injustice might occur: Some per-
sons might suffer because of the operation of the free society Nozick en-
visions (e.g., the independent in a territory where there is a DPA), and
others might suffer because the free society does not exist, or because of
deviations from the two basic principles. Either abuse could provide
a basis for state activity more extensive than that of the minimal state.
Nozick admits this. "[P]ast injustices might be so great as to make
necessary in the short run a more extensive state in order to rectify
them" (p. 231). Further, "one cannot use the analysis and theory
presented here to condemn any particular scheme of transfer pay-
ments" (p. 231). With an opening of this sort, it is unclear whether
Nozick provides a conceptual or theoretical alternative to standard
liberal democratic theorists who, on the whole, grudgingly back into
a justification of state coercion. In Nozick's view the reason for re-
distribution determines whether it is redistributive. Rawls' theory of
justice may be justified not as redistribution per se but as rectification
or compensation. If a theory like Rawls' is required by the principles
of compensation and rectification, its redistributive pattern can be
seen in a different light, since the reasons for it are rooted in the
rectification requirement. Ironically, Nozick fails to construct an
argument that will justify the minimal state but that cannot be extend-
ed to justify more than the minimal state. The discussion of
possible states more extensive than Nozick's minimal state is ambiguous.
A state could be more extensive in the sense that additional, different
grounds for justifying coercion were acceptable. Or a state could be
more extensive simply because it exercised a larger amount of coercion.
Under the latter conception, if more coercion were needed to enforce
the acquisition, transfer, and rectification principles than were needed
to enforce Rawls' two principles, a Nozick-endorsed state could be
more extensive than a Rawlsian one.
One merit of Nozick's work is clear, however. As we generate more
1975]
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and more laws and state regulations, we establish additional avenues
for government coercion of citizens. Nozick invites us to reexamine
our justification for coercion in the first place, and especially what
limit we apply to state coercion. Even if we do not set the limit at
the minimal state as Nozick does, we will, after encountering Nozick,
think more clearly about the limit of state coercion.
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MANAGEMENT AND CONTROL OF GROWTH: ISSUES, TECHNIQUES, PROB-
LEMS, TRENDS. Edited by Randall Scott,' David Brower,2 and Dallas
Miner.3 Washington, D.C.: Urban Land Institute. 1975. 3 Volumes.
Pp. xviii, 1779. $22.50.
Reviewed by Robert M. Rhodes4
The ethic of growth in America is increasingly being challenged;
no longer is it being accepted unquestioningly as a premise of
progress. Its effects on the quality of life are widely debated, and
its management and control are seen by many as essential elements
of modern land use policy. (Vol. I, p. 2)
Recognizing this challenge and its attendant conceptual combat,
the Urban Land Institute has assembled an anthology of material de-
signed to provide a convenient resource document for attorneys,
planners, public officials, developers, and others who share a common
concern with management and growth control issues and techniques.
These compilations accomplish their mission: they represent a cross-
section of basic material on several key growth management issues
as well as provide a point of departure for further research efforts.
The offerings pique, but do not overwhelm, one's taste for the sub-
ject. And happily, the editors maintain a relatively high degree of
philosophical balance among the contributors-proscription and pre-
scription, thrust and parry abound in the assembled articles by the
growth gurus. The volumes are well organized, replete with chapter
introductions, individual article descriptions, bibliography and an
executive summary.
The editors recognize that rhetoric is a congenital characteristic
of any growth management discussion. Hence, in an effort to es-
tablish a conceptual point of departure for the ensuing articles, man-
aged growth is defined as "the utilization by government of a variety
of traditional and evolving techniques . . . to purposefully guide local
patterns of land use, including the manner, location, rate, and nature
of development" (Vol. I, p. 4). The terms employed provide the
1. Research Counsel, Urban Law Institute.
2. Director of Urban Services, Center for Urban and Regional Studies, University
of North Carolina.
3. Director of Communications, Urban Law Institute.
4. A.B., University of California at Berkeley, 1964, J.D., 1968; M.P.A., Harvard
University, 1973. Member of the Florida Bar and the law firm of Thompson, Wads-
worth & Messer. Formerly Chief, Bureau of Land and Water Management, Florida
Division of State Planning; Executive Director, Governor's Property Rights Study Com-
mission.
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general polestar on which the articles guide; they also mirror the tra-
ditional bias of growth managers.
Emphasis solely upon governmental action to manage growth is
shortsighted and unduly optimistic. The interactive relationship be-
tween governmental action and the development industry is apparent
and is discussed in Chapter 19, "Prospectives From the Development
Sector." If quality of life is the perceived issue, the public and private
sectors must join forces on a more sustained basis. If managed growth
is the aim, the providers of growth products must be persuaded to buy
into the management program. Similarly, developers should be en-
couraged to participate fully in policy dialogue and to engage in
"diplomacy planning" (Vol. III, pp. 509-20). Clientele frustration
stimulated by governmental coercion inevitably leads to political
retribution capable of dismantling any management program. Hence
development, implementation and perfection of growth management
programs must include sound contributions from both government
and the private sector.
In addition, the editors appear to target local governments for
managed growth assaults. Chapter 4 fortunately provides several per-
suasive critiques of traditional local zoning and regulatory techniques;
Chapter 6 discusses exclusionary land use issues; Chapter 16 in-
corporates a number of articles relating to regional management ap-
proaches; and state growth policies are generally treated in Chapter
17. If growth is to be "purposefully" guided by innovative techniques,
I believe the weight of the evidence clearly reveals that local govern-
ments generally do not possess the fiscal resources, requisite jurisdic-
tion, or expansive perspective to accomplish this task. Regional or
state action may not provide the ultimate panacea; however, I feel
an appropriate mix of local, regional, and state powers, responsibilities,
and sensitivities provides a better opportunity to achieve the aim of
managed growth.
Finally, the editors curiously concentrate on land use as their sole
path to the attainment of managed growth. The merits of relying on
stringent land use regulations as the prime determinants of a managed
growth strategy are discussed in various chapters, particularly 6, 7, and
19. Land use emphasis versus comprehensive planning is a continuous
theme throughout the articles. Suffice it to say that public land use
programs must reflect and reinforce governmental policies relating
to the economy, transportation, housing, and manpower programs, to
mention a representative few. In Florida, early development patterns
were almost totally shaped by the availability of transportation routes.
What the neighborhood looked like after the immigrants settled was of
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secondary concern at best. Moreover, the presence or absence of water
continues to stimulate and channel primary growth decisions in south
Florida, notwithstanding the presence of land use controls.
Land use politics must also be considered. In developing its re-
port on the Florida Keys as an area of critical state concern, the Divi-
sion of State Planning necessarily focused on the impact that proposed
land use policies would have on the economy of the area. The Division
successfully argued that the well-being of the Keys' economy was in-
extricably linked to environmental quality and particular land use
patterns. In addition, a proposed governmental economic assistance
program for the Keys was developed by the Division and submitted to
the Governor and Cabinet prior to designation of the critical area.
Lacking these economic policy supports, I believe the vote designating
the Keys as an area of critical state concern would have been much
closer. Hence, under certain circumstances, land use regulation pro-
vides only one implementation tool in the growth management arsenal.
Additional factors obviously affect life quality and should be orchestrat-
ed with, and integrated into, a multi-faceted growth policy.
Fortunately these traditional definitional proclivities are not un-
duly stressed, and several articles dealing with "cutting edge" manage-
ment issues are presented. Volume I evaluates the "new attitudes" or
"new mood" concerning land use controls and growth as perceived
by a variety of commentators. Russell Train poses the question: "[I]s
more [growth] necessarily better?" and cautions: "We should avoid
dogmatic, categorical approaches. . . . Beware of insistent voices that
categorically tell us what our values should be" (Vol. I, p. 42). James
O'Leary bleakly describes the no-growth syndrome infecting a number
of communities, moratoria, and the paucity of accepted guidelines
for determining growth policy. A mid-1971 Forbes magazine article
aptly notes: " 'Welcome, Stranger,' the typical American attitude, is
fast changing to that of 'Stranger, Get Lost' " (Vol. I, p. 54). A synopsis
of the Rockefeller Task Force report, The Use of Land, is included
along with the full panoply of growth management tools recommended
by the Task Force. A critique of the Task Force's conclusions is provid-
ed by Basile Uddo.
The "traditional way of doing things" is critiqued by Heyman,
Babcock, and Bosselman. These articles outline the usual judicial
approaches to zoning and planning and point out the system's short-
comings. Ragsdale dissects Siegan's approach to land use without zoning
and Bosselman et al. provide a brief summary of The Taking Issue.
Hagman reviews The Taking Issue and introduces his concept of
1975]
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"trading windfalls for wipeouts." Impact fees are analyzed and
criticized by Jay Janis.
The limits to growth are explored by a number of authors who
alternatively stress the risks of growth or point out the dangers which
lie in zero population and economic growth. Several chapters address
the problems inherent in local attempts to exclude development, with
emphasis on exclusionary zoning affecting low-income persons. Litiga-
tion tactics are discussed in a perceptive article by Williams; Haar and
Iatridis evaluate the role of the judiciary in such cases.
Volume II examines growth management programs and experiences
of several communities, and explores the legal and policy ramifications
of various growth control techniques. Extensive analyses are offered of
the two major managed-growth cases of the early 1970's: those involving
Ramapo, New York (timed development), and Petaluma, California
(building cap). Articles by a number of the litigators, public officials,
planners, and others probe the policy questions and dilemmas present-
ed in these cases. These authors focus on the evolving issues of regional
general welfare, the right to travel, exclusion, and local governments'
authority to determine the acceptable amount or rate of development.
An article by Franklin examines the Ramapo and Petaluma cases,
as well as litigation involving Maricopa County (right to travel rela-
tive to residence requirement for public medical care), and Boulder,
Colorado (population cap established through water and sewer ser-
vice). Bosselman and Fielding offer perspectives on the right to travel/
mobility issue, which appears to present fertile ground for planners
and attorneys as growth controls are challenged across the nation.
Additional presentations cover interim development controls
(Freilich and Heeter), timing-phasing-sequencing of growth (Urban-
czyk), building permit restrictions (Allen), sewer moratoria (Rivkin),
and use of water and sewer facilities to control growth (Ramsay). A
final series of articles outlines various methodologies for impact
measurement, including fiscal analysis of proposed developments, the
Fairfax County evaluation-information system (UDIS), and extrapola-
tion techniques based on household size and school loads. Of particular
interest to non-statisticians are Gruen and Ashley's observations as
to how these analyses can be misapplied and shaped to support pre-
determined conclusions. The concluding offering in Volume II sum-
marizes the Council on Environmental Quality's study of "the cost of
sprawl."
Volume III explores the roles played by the several levels of
government in land use programs. Various chapters discuss land bank-
ing, transfer of development rights, planned unit developments, open
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space preservation, environmental impact statements, and other
techniques. Unfortunately, the large majority of these offerings are
primarily descriptive. A welcome contribution from the International
City Managers' Association relates the actual experiences a few locali-
ties have had with growth control programs. Among these brief presen-
tations is a discussion of Dade County's multiple moratoria.
Substantial experience has been developed working with most of
these techniques. Volume III could have provided a greater contribu-
tion if lawyers, planners, administrators, and legislators intimately
familiar with the enactment and implementation of primary manage-
ment techniques were commissioned to analyze their experiences. Very
few land management cases dealing with the new techniques are
assembled for the use of practitioners; consequently, public officials
and management system clientele are forced to reinvent the regulatory
wheel when growth management comes to town.5 We should be de-
veloping a case system for growth management similar to that of the
Public Administration Service. The experience is there; it must be
compiled so that it may be shared.
Florida alone provides a smorgasbord of state and local experience
and efforts to implement growth management programs. PUD's and
CUP's are alive and well in several central and south Florida counties.
Collier County has adopted a type of transfer of development rights
program called special treatment (ST) zones. Dade County has de-
veloped a "mini-DRI" review process for certain large-scale develop-
ment (SD) projects. The Division of State Planning's two years of
experience with developments of regional impact (DRI) and areas
of critical state concern is unmatched nationally, and still has not been
adequately analyzed. Instead of yet another illuminating exposition
of the American Law Institute's Model Land Development Code, why
not offer a series of analyses exploring how Florida's adopted version of
the Code is functioning and why enactment of the Model Code has
failed in a number of states?6 Boca Raton's population cap and Broward
County's impact fee program provide further study areas. Carrying-
5. When the Bureau of Land and Water Management was formulating its initial
policy regarding the "vested rights" provisions of the Environmental Land and Water
Management Act of 1972, FLA. STAT. §§ 380.012-.10 (1973), I called Joe Bodovitz, Execu-
tive Director of California's Coastal Zone Commission. One half-hour telephone call
concerning California's policies and subsequent vested rights litigation proved to be
of tremendous value as the Bureau began issuing vested rights determinations.
6. Bagne's article (Vol. III, p. 340), relating Washington State's experience could
serve as a starting point for such a compilation. I have analyzed Florida's experience with
the American Law Institute's Model Code for the American Institute of Planners. Rhodes,
Florida's Environmental Land and Water Management Act Implements Article 7 of the
ALl Model Code, 9 AIP NawsLs2rra 7 (1974).
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capacity concepts could be measured against the University of Florida's
work in Orlando and the Green Swamp. The 1974 Legislature's effort
to enact a state growth policy could be examined. Finally, the unique
role of the Governor's Property Rights Study Commission-its incep-
tion, focus on compensable regulations, and reports-could add addi-
tional flavor to a comprehensive analysis.
The point here is well stated by Priest in the Epilogue to the ULI
compilation: "The keys to solving problems raised by managed growth
lie in the political process and in institutional change within the private
and public sectors, not in litigation and court decisions" (Vol. III, p.
549). The complex mix of economic, legal, and social issues woven
throughout the growth management area can only be treated properly
and comprehensively by elected officials. The weighing of equities and
balancing of interests, which hopefully are revealed by a number of
predecision methodologies described in these volumes, will necessitate
legislative action. Even the greatest growth management conundrum-
the taking issue-must, and in my opinion will, be confronted by legis-
lative bodies.
And so the goals for the growth managers at this point must be
implementation, perfection of existing programs, and constituency
building. The managers must end their fraternal soliloquy and take
the traveling road show and the programmatic elixirs to the consuming
public. Government officials, administrators, and private clientele
groups must be persuaded that participating in the DRI process or
succumbing to moratoria makes a qualitative difference. The in-
evitable "thou shalt nots" must be discussed and understood in terms
of why we dare not. If such public support is not achieved, the growth
management movement will remain a luxury issue for a fair weather
day: something desirable, but not essential; something to be pursued
after the economic upturn, and not in conjunction with economic re-
vival measures. I doubt that such popular relegation is palatable to
the growth management advocates. A campaign of this type will re-
quire intensive scrutiny of the traditional reliance on the regulatory
process to achieve growth management goals. I suspect that increasing-
ly stringent regulations are producing some significant antithetical
results, e.g., driving developers to operate in minimally regulated areas,
discouraging large scale land assemblages and comprehensive develop-
ment of such areas, and pricing a large segment of our population out
of the new housing markets. Developers have forecast in the most dire
terms the ultimate effects of the new growth control mechanisms, but
we have not thoroughly analyzed the industry operating under these
restraints. Such analyses may reveal that less emphasis should be placed
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on negative adversary regulatory systems, and more on public-private
cooperative programs and endeavors. I believe such institutional change
is inevitable.
The Urban Land Institute has performed a service by assembling a
large amount of resource material on numerous growth related issues.
I hope the ULI will be able to follow with a similar set of commissioned
analytical offerings geared primarily to those parties who bear the
burden of implementing the techniques described in these three
volumes.
